ASSESSMENT OF PORT HEALTH OFFICERS' KNOWLEDGE, PRACTICES, AND PREPAREDNESS FOR DISEASE SCREENING AT NIGERIAN LAND BORDERS: EVIDENCE FROM SEME, CHIKANDA, AND JIBIYA BORDER POSTS

Abstract

The increasing movement of people and goods across international land borders heightens the risk of cross-border 
transmission of infectious diseases. Nigeria shares extensive land boundaries with several neighboring countries and 
operates numerous formal and informal crossings, making effective exit and entry screening a critical component of 
national preparedness and response in line with the International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005). Evidence on port 
health officers' knowledge, practices, and preparedness for disease screening at Nigerian land borders remains 
limited. This study assessed the knowledge and practices of port health officers regarding exit and entry screening. 
A descriptive cross-sectional study employing mixed methods was conducted at three strategically selected Nigerian 
land borders: Seme (South-West), Chikanda (North-Central), and Jibiya (North-West). Quantitative data were 
collected using structured questionnaires administered to 203 port health officers selected through proportional 
allocation and simple random sampling. Qualitative data were obtained through focus group discussions and 
observational checklists. Descriptive and inferential statistics were used for quantitative analysis, while thematic 
analysis was applied to qualitative data. Findings revealed awareness of exit and entry screening protocols; however, 
practical knowledge and procedural competence were moderate. Core capacity requirements including trained 
personnel (38.4%), functional screening equipment (48.3%), and isolation or quarantine facilities (8%) were 
critically deficient. Primary screening capacity was universal (100%), with body temperature measurement (88%) 
and symptom/exposure questioning (94%) widely implemented. Secondary screening capacity was available in only 
38% of facilities, on-site diagnostic services in 33%, and isolation facilities in only 8%. Environmental health 
officers, scientists, and record officers showed statistically significant associations with primary and secondary 
screening capacity (p < 0.05). Port health officers at Nigerian land borders demonstrate high awareness but 
inconsistent practices in disease screening, constrained by critical gaps in infrastructure, trained personnel, 
diagnostic capacity, and isolation facilities. Strengthening border health systems through sustained training, 
improved infrastructure investment, and enhanced compliance with IHR (2005) core capacities is essential to reduce 
the risk of disease importation.